Brandi Stam, by her Parent and Guardian, Lynn Roberston v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a Utah Corporation, sole; et al: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Brandi Stam, by her Parent and Guardian, Lynn
Roberston v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a
Utah Corporation, sole; et al: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sherene Dillon; Attorney for Respondent.
Daniel L. Wilson; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stam v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, No. 900120 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2499
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
U i 
C uMENT 
KHJ 
50 
DOCKET NO. lQQrffi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * 
BRANDI STAM, by her Parent and 
Guardian, LYNN ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah Corporation, sole; et al, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No: 900120-CA 
Priority No: 14b 
* * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE STANTON TAYLOR PRESIDING 
* * * * * * 
Sherene Dillon 
Attorney for Respondent 
340 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3680 
F I L E D 
MAY 11990 
MaryT K >M 
Cle-rkof t<* J-our* 
Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Appellant 
290-25th Street, Suite 204 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-6119 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 2 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS WHOSE LAND ABUTS A PUBLIC 
WAY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO USE ORDINARY CARE 
TO SEE THAT THE PASSAGE IS REASONABLY SAFE FOR 
TRAVEL 6 
POINT II THIS DEFENDANT OWES A SPECIAL DUTY TO THIS 
PLAINTIFF BECAUSE SHE IS A MINOR CHILD 7 
POINT III WHEN A LAND OWNER USES HIS LAND IN ANY WAY 
WHICH MIGHT POSE POSSIBLE DANGER TO CHILDREN, 
HE IS UNDER A DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRA CAUTION 
FOR THEIR SAFETY 8 
POINT IV PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS IN NEGLIGENCE AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS GENERALLY INAPPROPRIATE TO RESOLVE 
A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM ON ITS MERITS 11 
CONCLUSION 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 14 
ADDENDUM: 
ORDER A - 1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A - 4 
PHOTOGRAPH A - 6 
(ii) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
CASES PAGE(S) 
Anderson v. Toone. 671 P.2d 170, (Utah 1983) 11, 12 
Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 725 
(Utah 1985) ; 11 
Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, (Utah 1982) 11 
Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 214, 
371 P. 2d 211 (1962) 9 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 
P. 570 (1908) 9 
Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 P.2d 1245, 
(Utah 1977) 12 
Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6, 
(OK 1967) 11 
Christensen v. Los Angeles & SARR. 77 Utah 85, 291 P.926 
(193 0) 8 
Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Company. 542 P.2d 1090, 
(Utah 1975) 6 
Davis v. Provo City Corporation. 1 Utah 2d 244. 265 P.2d 
415 (1953) 8 
Elmer v. Vanderford. 445 P.2d 612 (WA 1968) 11 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, (Utah App. 1989) 11 
FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co.. 594 P.2d 1332, 
(Utah 1979) 11 
Ingram v. Salt Lake Citv. 733 P.2d 126 (UT 1987) 11 
Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982) 11 
Loney v. McPhillips. 521 P.2d 340 (OR 1974). 9 
Rees v. Albertson's Inc.. 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) 12 
(iii) 
Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company. 16 Utah 2d 183, 
397 P.2d 990, (1964) 8 
Robison v. Robison. 16 Utah 2d 2; 394 P.2d 876 (1964) 11 
Schulz v. Ouintana. 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978).. 6 
Singleton v. Alexander. 19 Utah 2d 292; 431 P.2d 126 (1967) 11 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 25 Utah 2d 168; 478 P.2d 496 
(1970) 8 
Wheeler v. Jones. 19 Utah 2d 392; 431 P.2d 985 7 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d 821 
(Utah App 1989) 11, 12 
TEXTS 
Prosser, Lav of Torts. 4th Ed, 1971 8 
STATUTES 
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Utah Constitution: Art I, §11 2, 12 
(iv) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION: 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j)• 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
The case under appeal is a negligence action brought by the guardian 
of a minor child who was injured in an automobile collision. The 
Defendant is the owner or occupier of land that abuts the scene of the 
accident- Plaintiff claims that the defendant either created or 
knowingly allowed to exist the hazardous condition that contributed to 
the accident. 
(1) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: 
Do owners and occupiers whose land abuts a public way have an 
obligation to use ordinary care to see that the passage is reasonably 
safe for travel. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES: 
Utah Constitution: Art I, § 11 (See Page 12 of this brief). 
(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A« Nature of the Case: This is a personal injury action filed by 
the parent and natural guardian of a minor child, seeking damages for 
injuries sustained when the minor child was struck by an automobile. 
Plaintiff claims that this defendant either created or knowingly allowed 
to exist a parking lot that constituted a hazardous condition in that 
pedestrian and bicycle traffic was forced out into the highway and into 
a place of danger because of an interrupted sidewalk and because the view 
of oncoming drivers was obstructed by a water containment box, (R 1 and 
2) . An original photograph of the water box and scene which shows the 
nature of the hazard is found at page 94 of the Record. A copy is also 
at A-5 of this brief. 
The foreseeable result of this dangerous condition is that passersby 
and particularly children who may be using the parking lot will be forced 
out in the street where they are hidden from the view of oncoming 
drivers. 
The driver of the vehicle and the owners of the water containment 
box were also named as defendants, but settlement was reached with these 
defendants and the action was dismissed as to them. 
B. Course of Proceedings: Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R 60 - 71) on the grounds that since they did not own the water 
box that actually obstructed the view nor the land upon which the water 
box was built, and because the water box existed prior to the time the 
church was built, that they owed no duty to this plaintiff. 
(3) 
C Disposition at Trial Court: The District Court, by Memorandum 
Decision (R 145), granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
D. Statement of Facts: On April 27, 1986, a 6:55 p.m. the 
Plaintiff, then 12 years old, was riding her bicycle in the parking lot 
of a church located in the vicinity of the 2000 block of Eastwood 
Boulevard in South Ogden, Utah (R 1) . As the Plaintiff left the parking 
lot on her bicycle she was forced to enter the street because the 
sidewalk did not extend to the parking lot in that area (See photographs 
of the scene at R 94, and also at Tab C of this brief). The sidewalk 
does not extend into this area because of a cement water containment box 
and landscaping rocks. These combine to obstruct the vision of oncoming 
drivers. (R 2) 
As the Plaintiff entered the street, she was struck by a vehicle 
being driven by a third party (R 1) . Suit was also filed against the 
driver of the vehicle and the owners of the water containment box. (R 1) . 
Settlement was reacted with those parties and the action was dismissed as 
to them. (R 78 and R 129) . 
(4) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant was an owner or occupier of 
land that abutted a public way and that, as such, is under an obligation 
to use ordinary care to see that the passage is reasonably safe for 
travel. Plaintiff maintains that ordinary care was not taken in this 
case because no sidewalk was provided for pedestrians and children on 
bicycles, therefore forcing them out into the street where the view of 
oncoming drivers is obstructed by the water containment box and 
landscaping rocks. 
A foreseeable result of the hazardous condition is that children 
will exit the parking lot into the street and be struck and injured by 
oncoming traffic. That is exactly what occurred in this instance and 
defendant must share some of the responsibility. 
(5) 
ARGUMENT 
I. OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS WHOSE LAND ABUTS A PUBLIC WAY HAVE AN 
OBLIGATION TO USE ORDINARY CARE TO SEE THAT THE PASSAGE IS REASONABLY 
SAFE FOR TRAVEL. 
The duty to provide a sidewalk for people coming to and from the 
church seems obvious. Passersby and others including children should not 
be forced into the street in order to make their way to and from the 
church. Conrad v. Walker Bank and Trust Co. 542 P.2d 1090, (Utah 1975). 
Indeed any land owner or occupier whose land abuts a public way is 
under an obligation to use ordinary care to see the passage is reasonably 
safe for travel. Furthermore, he will be held responsible for injuries 
resulting from any unreasonable risk to those using the road or sidewalk. 
Schultz v. Ouintana, 576 P.2d 855,856 (Utah 1978). 
Photographs of the water box and scene are provided at Tab C. (The 
photograph also appears at page 94 of the record) . These show the nature 
of the hazard created. A naturally foreseeable result of the obstacles 
shown will be that children and other passersby will be forced out into 
the street, and that they will be hidden from the view of oncoming 
drivers. The injury that occurred in this instance is exactly the type 
of event that should have been readily foreseeable to this Defendant as 
a result of permitting such an obvious hazard. 
(6) 
Defendant has a duty to take into account both natural and manmade 
hazards as they exist when they take it upon themselves to make 
improvements to property. Especially when those improvements are 
designed to attract people to the location. People have to come and 
people have to leave. The foreseeability of injury alone creates a duty 
to reasonably anticipate and avoid known perils. 
II. THIS DEFENDANT OWES A SPECIAL DUTY TO THIS PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
SHE IS A MINOR CHILD. 
In Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an occupier (not necessarily an owner) of land has a duty 
with regard to the safety of his guests to exercise reasonable care to 
discover dangerous conditions on the land and to protect the safety of 
visitors from that hazard. The Court went on to hold that a special duty 
is owed to children: 
"There is a greater duty imposed by law upon an occupier 
of land to use care for the safety of his guests, when 
those guests are children of tender years, then there is 
when they are mature people." Id. 
The Wheeler, Court went on to say: 
"Negligence is the breach of a duty to use due care under 
the circumstances under the situation. When children are 
involved, the duty to look out for their safety is 
increased, and the failure to make the given discovery 
might be negligence when children are involved and not 
negligence if adults only are affected." Id at 397, 
There are many other cases where the Utah Supreme Court has 
refused to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine discussed in 
paragraph III below, but has nevertheless allowed child trespassers 
to recover on other theories, such as where they are deemed to be 
protected by a higher standard of care. See Christiansen v. Los 
(7) 
Anaeles and SARR, 77 Utah 85, 291 P.926 (1930); Stephens v. Salt 
Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970); Davis v. Provo 
City Corporation. 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P.2d 415 (1953). 
III. WHEN A LANDOWNER USES HIS LAND IN ANY WAY WHICH MIGHT 
POSE POSSIBLE DANGER TO CHILDREN, HE IS UNDER A DUTY TO OBSERVE 
EXTRA CAUTION FOR THEIR SAFETY. 
Normally, owners and occupiers are only responsible for 
injuries to passersby caused by artificial conditions on their 
land, Prosser, Law of Torts. Section 57 at 354-55 (4th ed. 1971). 
The driveway is an artificial condition and an invitation to 
danger. 
In this case, the hazard to children like Brandi Stam is 
obvious. A church parking lot is known to be equivalent to a 
playground for children living in a residential neighborhood such 
as this. With foreseeable danger comes the duty to correct the 
danger. Hence, negligence for a failure to do so. 
The facts of this case are made far more pointed when you 
consider that a child was injured. Generally, when a landowner uses 
his land in any way which might pose possible danger to children, 
he is under a duty to observe extra caution for their safety, See 
Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 185; 397 P.2d 
990, 991-2 (1964) (six year old child hit by car while riding on a 
sleigh). The landowner or occupier will not be liable for injuries 
to trespassing children caused by natural conditions, but may be 
liable for injuries to trespassing children caused by dangerous 
(8) 
artificial conditions on his land. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 
Utah 222, 239; 93 P.570, 576 (1908); Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City. 
13 Utah 2d 214; 371 P.2d 211 (1962); Loney v. McPhillips, 521 P.2d 
340 (OR 1974) . A parking lot is an artificial condition on the 
land. It is very foreseeable that children will use the parking 
lot when it is located in the very center of a residential 
neighborhood. 
Since the parking lot itself is an unnatural condition, its 
placement and design must include reasonable ingress and egress. 
It follows that these considerations must take into account other 
obstacles placed in the area irrespective of whether or not those 
other obstacles belong to the owner of the parking lot. 
This rule, often termed the "attractive nuisance doctrine", 
was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the important case of 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P.570 (1908). In that 
case, the Court held that the doctrine should be applied " to all 
things that are uncommon and are artificially produced, and which 
are attractive and alluring to children of immature discretion and 
judgment and which are inherently dangerous, and where it is 
practical to guard against them without serious inconvenience and 
without great expense to the owner. Id at 240 (93 P.at 576) . Lets 
examine each of these elements in detail. 
a. Is a parking lot uncommon? It is if it's placed in the 
center of a residential neighborhood. Its fair to say that the 
parking lot at issue in this case is quite uncommon for the area. 
That's exactly the reason children are attracted to it. 
(9) 
b. Was it artificially produced? Certainly. 
c. Is it attractive and alluring to children of immature 
judgment and discretion? One need only drive through any 
neighborhood in the city to see that parking lots in the middle of 
residential areas are like magnets for children. 
d. Is it inherently dangerous? Perhaps not the parking lot 
itself, but certainly the driveway that leads to and from and 
forces any child leaving the area on a bicycle onto the street. 
Ask any police officer or other person familiar with traffic safety 
where the greatest hazard on any street is located. They will tell 
you that driveways contribute to a large percentage of all 
accidents. 
e. Is it practical to guard against the danger without serious 
inconvenience and without great expense to the owner? One need 
only look at the pictures to see how easy it would have been to 
extend the sidewalk, and, if necessary merely ramp over the water 
box itself. If the ramp was more expensive than moving the water 
box, then of course the movement of the water box could have been 
addressed. Certainly the builders of the parking lot were the ones 
that had the obligation to consider these options. The defendant 
will not genuinely deny that they are the ones that chose instead 
to put the rocks in place to further impede the flow of pedestrian 
traffic in the area. 
(10) 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS IN NEGLIGENCE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS INAPPROPRIATE TO RESOLVE A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM ON ITS MERITS. 
This is a negligence case. As a general proposition, summary 
judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its 
merits. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 
1989), quoting Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 at 126. See 
also Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Of particular concern is the precept that "ordinarily, whether 
a defendant has breached the required standard of care is a 
question of fact for the Jury". Jackson v. Dabney, 64 5 P.2d 613, 
615 (Utah 1982). See also Ingram, 733 P.2d at 127; Bowen, 656 P.2d 
at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 
1334-35 (Utah 1979); Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 
876, 877 (1964). Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate 
unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law,11 Wycalis, 
780 P.2d 821, quoting, Elmer v. Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612,614 (Wash. 
1968); see also Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. vs. Hawes, 424 
P.2d 6, 10 (Okla. 1967), and when reasonable minds could reach but 
one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances. See Jackson 645 P. 2d at 615; Singleton v. 
Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); English v. Kienke, 
774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989). 
(ID 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that since 
summary disposition denies the losing party "the privilege of a 
trial," Art. I, §11 of the Utah Constitution suggests that "doubt 
or uncertainty as to the questions of negligence... should be 
resolved in favor of granting.... a trial." Wycalis, Id, quoting 
Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). See 
also Anderson, 671 P.2d at 172; Rees v. Albertsonfs Inc., 587 P.2d 
130, 133 (Utah 1978). 
(12) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs claim for damages are well founded because there 
are many facts alleged which, if proven will establish a duty to 
this Plaintiff and a breach of that duty by this Defendant. 
Plaintiff requests that summary judgment of the District Court be 
reversed and this case remanded for trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j&J day ofjj2dst l*V~ ,1990 
U^ Ju^  {AvU** 
Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
(13) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and exact copies 
of the forgoing brief, postage prepaid, to Sherene Dillon, Attorney 
for Defendant, 330 South Third East, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111, this 
j€£ day of "Wia^^ 1990 
*T-
Daniel L. Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
(14) 
Wilford W. Kirton (A1834) 
Sherene T. Dillon (A4820) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Defendants 
Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, a 
Utah corporation sole 
3 30 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
S^U^ Hti\ f 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRANDI STAM, by her Parent and 
Guardian, LYNN ROBERTSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah corporation sole; JOSHUA 
CHRISTENSEN and SHIRLEY M. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
< 2 * 
Civil No. £#0903998 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
On August 31, 1989 the defendant Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. After the plaintiff Brandi 
Stam filed her response she filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the 
Rules of Judicial Administration, a Notice to Submit the Memorandum 
for decision. Based upon this Courtf s careful review of all of the 
ft-1 
Memoranda submitted in this case, and the Court being fully advised 
in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation solefs Motion for Summary 
Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE, its Motion for 
Sanctions against the plaintiff is hereby DENIED, the parties to 
bear their own costs and attorneys fees in relation to this Motion. 
DATED this 1 % day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stairton M. Taylor 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Daniel Wilson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No, 880903998 
The Court grants defendant Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop,s motion for summary judgment, but denies its motion for 
sanctions. 
DATED this day of November, 1989 
/L ^  U 
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